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Abstract
The existence of downward nominal wage rigidity has been abundantly documented,
but what are its economic implications? This paper demonstrates that, even when
wages are allocative, downward wage rigidity can be consistent with weak macroeco-
nomic e¤ects. Firms have an incentive to compress wage increases as well as wage
cuts when downward wage rigidity binds. By neglecting compression of wage increases,
previous literature may have overstated the costs of downward wage rigidity to rms.
Using microdata from the US and Great Britain, I nd that evidence for compression
of wage increases when downward wage rigidity binds. Accounting for this reduces the
estimated increase in aggregate wage growth due to wage rigidity to be much closer
to zero. These results suggest that downward wage rigidity may not provide a strong
argument against the targeting of low ination rates.
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A longstanding issue in macroeconomics has been the possible long run disemployment
e¤ects of low ination. The argument can be traced back to Tobin (1972): If workers are
reluctant to accept reductions in their nominal wages, a certain amount of ination may
grease the wheelsof the labor market by easing reductions in real labor costs that would
otherwise be prevented. This concern has resurfaced with renewed vigor among economists
and policymakers in recent years as ination has declined and evidence for downward rigid-
ity in nominal wages has accumulated. A stylized fact of recent micro-data on wages is
the scarcity of nominal wage cuts relative to nominal wage increases (Lebow, Stockton, &
Wascher, 1995; Kahn, 1997; Card & Hyslop, 1997). This evidence dovetails with surveys
of wage-setters and negotiators who report that they are reluctant to cut workerswages
(see Howitt, 2002, for a survey). In an inuential study, Bewley (1999) nds that a key
reason for this reluctance is the belief that nominal wage cuts damage worker morale, and
that morale is a key determinant of worker productivity.1
Exploring the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidity from both
a theoretical and an empirical perspective, I nd that these e¤ects are likely to be small.
Section 1 begins by formulating an explicit model of worker resistance to nominal wage
cuts.2 Based on Bewleys results, the model makes the simple assumption that wage rigidity
arises because the productivity of workers declines sharply following nominal wage cuts.3
Wage rigidity, according to Bewleys evidence, is therefore allocative in the sense of Barro
(1977), because it a¤ects the productivity of workers. This simple assumption implies a
key insight that has not been recognized in the literature that nominal wage increases in
this environment become irreversible to some degree. A rm that raises the wage today,
but reverses its decision by cutting the wage by an equal amount tomorrow will experience
a reduction in productivity: Todays wage increase will raise productivity, but tomorrows
wage cut will reduce productivity by a greater amount.4
1While Bewleys explanation has been inuential, it is not the only possible explanation. Other studies
have suggested that the tendency for past nominal wages to act as the default outcome in wage negotiations
can lead to downward wage rigidity (MacLeod & Malcomson, 1993; Holden, 1994).
2Given the empirical evidence for worker resistance to wage cuts, it is surprising that there has not yet
been an explicit model of such wage rigidity in the literature. The need for such a model has been noted
by Shar, Diamond & Tversky (1997, p.371): Plausibly, the relationship [between wages and e¤ort] is not
continuous: there is a discontinuity coming from nominal wage cuts.... A central issue is how to model such
a discontinuity.This sentiment is echoed more recently by Altonji & Devereux (2000, p.423 note 7) who
write: [I]t is surprising to us that there is no rigorous treatment in the literature of how forward looking
rms should set wages when it is costly to cut nominal wages.
3Bewley also suggests that wage rigidity is enhanced by rmsinability to discriminate pay across workers
within a rm. For simplicity, I abstract from this possibility. For models that incorporate this feature, but
abstract from downward nominal wage rigidity, see Thomas (2005), and Snell & Thomas (2007).
4In this sense, the model is formally similar to asymmetric adjustment cost models, such as the investment
model of Abel & Eberly (1996) and the labor demand model of Bentolila & Bertola (1990).
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Section 2 shows that this simple insight equips us with a fundamental prediction: Firms
will compress wage increases as well as wage cuts in the presence of downward wage rigidity.
This occurs through two channels. First, forward-looking rms temper wage increases as a
precaution against future costly wage cuts. Raising the wage today increases the likelihood
of having to cut the wage, at a cost, in the future. Second, even in the absence of forward-
looking behavior, downward wage rigidity raises the level of wages that rms inherit from
the past. As a result, rms do not have to raise wages as often or as much to obtain their
desired wage level.
These two forms of compression of wage increases culminate in the perhaps surprising
prediction that worker resistance to wage cuts has no e¤ect on aggregate wage growth in
the model. This result challenges a common intuition in previous empirical literature on
downward wage rigidity. This literature has assumed (implicitly or otherwise) that the
existence of downward wage rigidity has no e¤ect on wage increases.5 In addition, many
studies go on to report positive estimates of the e¤ect of downward wage rigidity on aggregate
wage growth, seemingly in contradiction to the predictions of the model. The model suggests
an explanation for this result: Neglecting compression of wage increases leads a researcher to
ignore a source of wage growth moderation, and thereby overstate the increase in aggregate
wage growth due to downward wage rigidity.
To assess the empirical relevance of rmscompression of wage increases as a response
to downward wage rigidity testable implications of the model are derived to take to the
data. The implied percentiles of the distribution of wage growth across workers can be
characterized using the model. This reveals that the e¤ects of downward wage rigidity on
the compression of wage increases can be determined by observing the e¤ects of the rates of
ination and productivity growth on these percentiles. Higher ination eases the constraint
of downward nominal wage rigidity which in turn reduces the compression of wage increases,
raising the upper percentiles of wage growth. A symmetric logic holds for the e¤ects of
productivity growth.
Evidence on these predictions is presented in section 3 using a broad range of micro-
data for the US and Great Britain. I nd signicant evidence for compression of wage
increases related to downward wage rigidity, consistent with the implications of the model.
Moreover, accounting for this limits the estimated increase in aggregate real wage growth
due to downward wage rigidity from up to 1.5 percentage points to no more than 0.15 of a
percentage point, an order of magnitude smaller.
5This is a key identifying assumption in Card & Hyslop (1997). However, their analysis is no more subject
to this criticism than other previous empirical work on downward wage rigidity: Kahn (1997), Altonji &
Devereux (2000), Nickell & Quintini (2003), Fehr & Goette (2005), Dickens et al. (2006), among others,
implicitly make the same assumption.
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Section 4 then considers the implications of these results for the true implied costs of
downward wage rigidity to rms. A simple approximation method allows these costs to
be quantied using moments of the available micro-data on wages. This approximation
reveals that the model implies that the costs of wage rigidity are driven by reductions in
workers e¤ort that rms must accept when they reduce wages, contrary to the common
intuition that downward wage rigidity increases the cost of labor. In addition, erroneously
concluding that downward wage rigidity raises the rate of aggregate wage growth, as previous
literature has done, leads to a substantial (more than twofold) overstatement of the costs of
downward wage rigidity on rms. Finally, a sense of the magnitude of the implied long run
disemployment e¤ects of wage rigidity can be gleaned from the model. For rates of ination
and productivity growth observed in the data, the e¤ects of downward nominal wage rigidity
under zero ination are unlikely to reduce employment by more than 0.25 of a percentage
point.6 ;7
Based on these results, I conclude that the macroeconomic e¤ects of downward wage
rigidity are likely to be small, especially relative to the implications of previous empirical
literature on wage rigidity. This suggests that downward nominal wage rigidity does not
provide a strong argument against the adoption of a low ination target. Importantly,
however, this result is nevertheless consistent with the diverse body of evidence that suggests
workers resist nominal wages cuts. This conclusion therefore complements recent research
that has argued for the targeting of low ination rates in the context of models in which
wage rigidity has no allocative e¤ects (see e.g. Goodfriend & King, 2001). The results of
this paper suggest that such a conclusion also extends to a model of allocative wage rigidity
based on evidence that workers resist wage cuts (Bewley, 1999).
1 A Model of Worker Resistance to Wage Cuts
This section presents a simple model of downward nominal wage rigidity based on the obser-
vations detailed in the empirical literatures mentioned above. Consider the optimal wage
6Despite some common formal elements, the mechanism here is distinct from that emphasized by Caplin
& Spulber (1987). They show that the uniformity of the e¤ects of aggegrate monetary shocks on individual
real prices can yield monetary neutrality in an (s,S) pricing environment. In the current analysis, rms
endogenous wage setting response to idiosyncratic shocks allows them to obviate much of the costs of worker
resistance to wage cuts.
7This result may also help to reconcile an apparent puzzle in the literature. In contrast to micro-level
evidence, empirical support for the macroeconomic e¤ects of downward wage rigidity has been relatively
scant (Card & Hyslop, 1997; Lebow, Saks & Wilson, 1999; Nickell & Quintini, 2003; Smith, 2004). The
results of this paper suggest a simple explanation: Since previous studies have ignored compression of wage
increases, this has led researchers to overstate the increase in aggregate wage growth and thereby the implied
costs of downward wage rigidity to rms.
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policies of worker-rm pairs for whom the productivity of an incumbent worker (denoted e)
depends upon the wage according to
e = ln (!=b) + c ln (W=W 1)1 ; (1)
where W is the nominal wage, W 1 the lagged nominal wage, 1  an indicator for a nominal
wage cut, !  W=P the real wage, and b a measure of real unemployment benets (which
is assumed to be constant over time). The parameter c > 0 varies the productivity cost to
the rm of a nominal wage cut.
The key qualitative feature of this e¤ort function is the existence of a kink at W = W 1
reecting a workers resistance to nominal wage cuts. The marginal productivity loss of a
nominal wage cut exceeds the marginal productivity gain of a nominal wage increase by a
factor of 1 + c > 1. This characteristic is what makes nominal wage increases (partially)
irreversible a nominal wage increase can only be reversed at an additional marginal cost of
c. Clearly, this irreversibility is the key feature of the model, and the parameter c determines
its importance for wage setting.8
The e¤ort function, (1), can be interpreted as a very simple way of capturing the ba-
sic essence of the motivations for downward wage rigidity mentioned in the literature. It
is essentially a parametric form of e¤ort functions in the spirit of the fair-wage e¤ort hy-
pothesis expounded by Solow (1979) and Akerlof & Yellen (1986), with an additional term
reecting the impact of nominal wage cuts on e¤ort. Bewley (1999) also advocates such a
characterization, but sees wage cuts rather than wage levels as critical for worker morale.9
Given the e¤ort function (1), consider a discrete-time, innite-horizon model in which
price-taking worker-rm pairs choose the nominal wage Wt at each date t to maximize
the expected discounted value of prots. For simplicity, assume that each worker-rms
production function is given by ae, where a is a real technology shock that is idiosyncratic to
the worker-rm match, is observed contemporaneously, and acts as the source of uncertainty
in the model. It is convenient to express the rms prot stream in constant date t prices.
To this end, dene the price level at date t as Pt and assume that it evolves according to
8The precise parametric form of (1) is chosen primarily for analytical convenience. None of the qualitative
results emphasized in what follows depends on the specic parametric form of (1) the key is that e¤ort is
increasing in the wage and kinked around the lagged nominal wage.
9In Bewleys words: The only one of the many theories of wage rigidity that seems reasonable is the
morale theory of Solow...,(Bewley, 1999, p.423), and The [Solow] theory...errs to the extent that it attaches
importance to wage levels rather than to the negative impact of wage cuts,(Bewley, 1999, p.415). However,
such is the intricacy of Bewleys study, he would probably consider (1) a simplication, not least for its neglect
of emphasis on morale as distinct from productivity, and of the internal wage structure of rms as a source
of wage rigidity. I argue that it is a useful simplication as it provides key qualitative insights into the
implied dynamics of wage-setting under more nuanced theories of morale.
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Pt = e
Pt 1, where  reects ination.10 Denoting the nominal counterparts, At  Ptat
and Bt  Ptb and substituting for et, the value of a job with lagged nominal wage W 1 and
nominal productivity A in recursive form11 is given by
J (W 1; A) = max
W

A

ln (W=B) + c ln (W=W 1)1 
 W + e  Z J (W;A0) dF (A0jA) :
(2)
where  2 [0; 1) is the real discount factor of the rm.
1.1 Some Intuition for the Model
To anticipate the models results, this subsection provides intuition for each of the predictions
of the model. First, the model predicts that there will be a spike at zero in the distribution
of nominal wage changes. This arises because of the kink in the rms objective function
at the lagged nominal wage. Thus, there will be a range of values (region of inaction)
for the nominal shock, A, for which it is optimal not to change the nominal wage. Since
A is distributed across rms, there will exist a positive fraction of rms each period whose
realization of A lies in their region of inaction that will not change their nominal wage.
Second, if a rm does decide to change the nominal wage, the wage change will be
compressed relative to the case where there is no wage rigidity. That nominal wage cuts
are compressed is straightforward: Wage cuts involve a discontinuous fall in productivity
at the margin, so the rm will be less willing to implement them. It is only slightly less
obvious why nominal wage increases are also compressed in this way. The reason is that,
in an uncertain world, increasing the wage today increases the likelihood that the rm will
have to cut the wage, at a cost, in the future.
An additional, perhaps more fundamental outcome of the model is that an inability to
cut wages will tend to raise the wages that rms inherit from the past. Consequently, even in
the absence of the forward-looking motive outlined above, wage increases will be compressed
simply because rms do not have to increase wages by as much or as often in order to achieve
their desired wage level.12 ;13
A nal prediction concerns the e¤ect of increased ination on these outcomes. Com-
10Strictly speaking,  is equal to the logarithm of one plus the ination rate. Thus  approximates the
ination rate only when ination is low.
11I adopt the convention of denoting lagged values by a subscript,  1, and forward values by a prime, 0.
12Identifying this additional e¤ect is an important benet of the innite horizon model studied here.
Although compression due to forwardlooking behavior would arise in a simpler two-period model, this
additional e¤ect will be shown to be an outcome of steady state considerations, which cannot be treated in
a two-period context.
13Compression of wage increases resulting from the impact of downward wage rigidity on past wages is
implicit in the myopic model of Akerlof, Dickens & Perry (1996).
6
pression of wage increases will become less pronounced as ination rises. Higher ination
implies that rms are less likely to cut wages either in the past or the future. As a result,
forward-looking rms no longer need to restrain raises as much as a precaution against future
costly wage cuts. Likewise, higher ination implies that wages inherited from the past are
less likely to have been constrained by downward wage rigidity. Thus, rms will raise wages
more often to reach their desired wage level.
1.2 The Dynamic Model
To make the above intuition precise, consider the solution to the full dynamic model, (2).
Taking the rst-order condition with respect to W , conditional on W 6= 0, yields
 
1 + c1 

(A=W )  1 + e D (W;A) = 0; if W 6= 0; (3)
where D (W;A)  R JW (W;A0) dF (A0jA) is the marginal e¤ect of the current wage choice
on the future prots of the rm. A key step in solving for the rms wage policy involves
characterizing the function D (). For the moment, however, note that the general structure
of the wage policy is as follows:
Proposition 1 The optimal wage policy in the dynamic model is given by
W =
8><>:
U 1(A) if A > U (W 1) Raise
W 1 if A 2 [L (W 1) ; U (W 1)] Freeze
L 1 (A) if A < L (W 1) Cut
(4)
where the functions U () and L () satisfy
(U (W ) =W )  1 + e D (W;U (W ))  0 (5)
(1 + c) (L (W ) =W )  1 + e D (W;L (W ))  0:
Proposition 1 states that the rms optimal wage takes the form of a trigger policy. For
large realizations of the nominal shock A above the upper trigger U (W 1), the rm raises the
wage. For realizations below the lower trigger L (W 1), the wage is cut. For intermediate
values of A nominal wages are left unchanged.14
14Concavity of the rms problem in W ensures that the rst order conditions (3) characterize optimal
wage setting when the wage is adjusted. The remainder of the result follows from the continuity of the
optimal value for W in A. Intuitively, since the rms objective, (2), is continuous in A and concave in W ,
realizations of A just above the upper trigger U (W 1) will lead the rm to raise the wage just above the
lagged wage. A symmetric logic holds for wage cuts. Formally, continuity of the optimal value of W in the
state variable A follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (see e.g. Stokey & Lucas, 1989, pp. 62-63).
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To complete the characterization of the rms wage policy, it is necessary to establish the
functions U (), and L (). It can be seen from (5) that, in order to solve for these functions,
one requires knowledge of the functions D (W;U (W )) and D (W;L (W )). This is aided by
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The function D () satises
D (W;A) =
Z U(W )
L(W )
[(A0=W )  1] dF  
Z L(W )
0
c (A0=W ) dF + e 
Z U(W )
L(W )
D (W;A0) dF; (6)
which is a contraction mapping in D (), and thus has a unique xed point.
The rst term on the right hand side of (6) represents tomorrows expected within-period
marginal benet, given that W 0 is set equal to W . To see this, note that the rm will freeze
tomorrows wage if A0 2 [L (W ) ; U (W )], and that in this event a wage level of W today will
generate a within-period marginal benet of (A0=W )  1. Similarly, the second term on the
right hand side of (6) represents tomorrows expected marginal cost, given that the rm cuts
the nominal wage tomorrow. Finally, the last term on the right hand side of (6) accounts for
the fact that, in the event that tomorrows wage is frozen, the marginal e¤ects of W persist
into the future in a recursive fashion. It is this recursive property that provides the key to
determining the function D ().15
For the purposes of the present paper, a specic form for F () is used. Assume that real
shocks, a, evolve according to the geometric random walk,
ln a0 = + ln a  1
2
2 + "0; (7)
where the innovation "0  N (0; 2) and  reects productivity growth. Given that prices
evolve according to P 0 = eP , this yields the following process for nominal shocks, A,
lnA0 = +  + lnA  1
2
2 + "0; (8)
where  reects ination. Note that this has the simple implication that E (A0jA) =
exp (+ )A, so that average nominal productivity rises in line with ination and pro-
ductivity growth.
This information can be used to determine the full solution as follows. First, the functions
D (W;U (W )) and D (W;L (W )) can be solved for using equation (6) via the method of
15Proposition 2 states that this recursive property takes the form of a contraction mapping in D. To see
that (6) is a contraction, note that Blackwells su¢ cient conditions can be veried. Monotonicity of the
map in D is straightforward. To see that discounting holds, note that e  < 1 and the probability that
A0 lies in the inaction region [L (W ) ; U (W )] is less than one.
8
undetermined coe¢ cients. Given these, the solutions for U (W ) and L (W ) can be obtained
using the equations in (5). Proposition 3 shows that this method yields a wage policy that
takes a simple piecewise linear form.
Proposition 3 If nominal shocks evolve according to the geometric random walk, (8), the
functions U () and L () are of the form
U (W ) = U W , and L (W ) = L W; (9)
where U and L are given constants that depend upon the parameters of the model, fc; ; ; ; g.
2 Predictions
Anticipating the empirical results documented later, this section draws out a set of relation-
ships predicted by the model that can be estimated using available data.
2.1 Compression of Wage Increases
An important outcome of the model is that it naturally implies that downward wage rigidity
leads rms to reduce the magnitude of wage increases, and that this occurs through two
e¤ects. The rst channel is implied by the properties of the coe¢ cients of the optimal wage
policy, U and L in (9). While closed-form solutions for U and L are not available, it is
straightforward to compute them numerically. Doing so establishes that U > 1 > L in the
presence of downward wage rigidity (when c > 0).
It is instructive to contrast this result with some simple special cases of the model. First,
consider the frictionless model where c = 0. Denoting frictionless outcomes with an asterisk,
it is straightforward to show that U = 1 = L, so that frictionless wages W  are equal to
the nominal shock A, and wage changes fully reect changes in productivity. The result
that L < 1 in the general model therefore means that rms are avoiding wage cuts that they
would have implemented in the absence of wage rigidity. This is a simple implication of the
discontinuous fall in e¤ort at the margin following a wage cut.
Likewise, the result that U > 1 when c > 0 implies that rms are reducing the wage in
the event that they increase pay relative to a frictionless world. As a result, for a given
level of the lagged wage, this will serve to reduce the magnitude of wage increases, leading
to one form of compression of wage increases. To understand the intuition for this result,
a useful point of contrast is the special case of the model in which rms are myopic,  = 0.
In this case, it is simple to show that U=0 = 1 > L=0 = 1= (1 + c). It follows that the
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result that U > 1 in the general model is driven by the forward looking behavior of rms.
Intuitively, raising the nominal wage today increases the likelihood that a rm will wish to
cut the wage, at a cost, in the future.
The second source of compression of wage increases relates to the e¤ect of downward
wage rigidity on the lagged wages of rms. Specically, rmsinability to reduce wages in
the past will place upward pressure on the wage that they inherit from previous periods.
As a result, rms do not need to raise wages as often or as much to achieve any given level
of the current wage, further serving to reduce the magnitude of wage increases. The joint
forces of these two e¤ects culminate in the following, perhaps surprising, result:
Proposition 4 Downward wage rigidity has no e¤ect on aggregate wage growth in steady
state.
This result can be interpreted as a simple requirement for the existence of a steady state
in which average growth rates are equal. Since productivity shocks grow on average at a
constant rate, so must wages grow at that same rate in the long run. Even a model with
downward wage rigidity must comply with this steady state condition in the long run.16
Note that this result holds regardless of how forward looking rms are. Even if rms
are myopic ( = 0), so they do not reduce wages in the event that they increase pay, wage
rigidity will still have no e¤ect on aggregate wage growth. The reason is that the second
channel through which wage increases are compressed dominates because rms inherit higher
wages from the past.
2.2 Implications for the Literature on Wage Rigidity
Surprisingly, none of the previous research on downward wage rigidity has taken account
of the compression of wage increases that is implied by worker resistance to wage cuts (see
among others, Kahn, 1997; Card & Hyslop, 1997; Altonji & Devereux, 2000). This
section shows that neglecting this compression can lead a researcher to overstate the e¤ects
of downward wage rigidity on the aggregate growth of real wages.
Figure 1 illustrates the point. It shows three simulated wage growth distributions derived
from the model of section 1. The histogram shows the distribution of real wage growth in
the presence of wage rigidity (c > 0), whereas the solid line illustrates the true frictionless
wage growth density (c = 0). Comparing these two distribution provides a visual impression
of the results highlighted above: Downward wage rigidity leads to both fewer wage cuts, as
well as fewer wage increases. Figure 1 also includes a median symmetricdensity (dashed
16A similar result has been established in the investment literature by Bloom (2000).
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line) that is implied if one assumes erroneously that downward wage rigidity has no e¤ect on
wage increases.17 It can be seen that, by using the median symmetric counterfactual, one
obtains an overestimate of the increase in average wage growth due to wage rigidity. This
occurs as a direct result of the compression of the upper tail of wage growth. Neglecting
this compression leads to an overstatement of the mass of desired frictionless wage cuts, and
thereby of the e¤ects of wage rigidity on average wage growth.
This observation has important implications for the conclusions of the previous literature.
Many studies go on to report positive estimates of the increase in aggregate real wage growth
driven by downward rigidity as a measure of the costs of wage rigidity imposed on rms.
For example, Card & Hyslop (1997) provide results which suggest that downward wage
rigidity increases average real wage growth by around one percentage point in times of low
ination. Similar exercises are performed in Nickell & Quintini (2003), Fehr & Goette
(2005), Dickens et al. (2006), among others. These results are surprising in the light of
the model above: If downward wage rigidity had any e¤ect on average real wage growth, it
would imply a violation of steady state in the labor market. A natural question in the light
of this is whether it is empirically the case that rms compress wage increases in the face of
downward wage rigidity.
2.3 Empirical Implications
The model implies two simple approaches to testing the prediction that rms compress wage
increases as a response to downward wage rigidity. The rst is anticipated in Figure 1: If
rms compress wage increases, one should observe the upper tail of the distribution of wage
growth shifting inwards as downward wage rigidity binds. The model also suggests when
this will occur. When ination is high, rmsdesired wage growth,  lnW  =  lnA is
unlikely to be negative. Thus, downward rigidity of nominal wages is unlikely to bind now
or in the future, rms will not compress wage increases, and the distribution of wage growth
will converge to the solid line in Figure 1. When ination is low, however, downward wage
rigidity will bind for many rms, wage increases will be compressed and the distribution of
wage growth will look like the histogram in Figure 1.18 This suggests a simple visual test
of the model by inspecting the distribution of real wage growth in high compared to low
ination periods.
Second, the model yields predictions on the e¤ect of ination and productivity growth
17This is derived by imposing symmetry in the upper tail of the distribution of wage growth with c > 0.
This is, in fact, the method used by Card & Hyslop (1997) to generate an estimate of the frictionless wage
growth distribution.
18Likewise, high levels of productivity growth, , will also relax the constraint of downward wage rigidity.
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on the percentiles of the distribution of real wage growth. These percentiles can be approx-
imated as follows:
Proposition 5 The percentiles of the distribution of real wage growth satisfy
E (Pnj; ) 
8><>:
  cp  (; ) + constn if Pn >  
  otherwise
+ cp+

(; ) + constn if Pn <  ;
(10)
where p 

(; ) and p+

(; ) are respectively the frictionless (c = 0) probabilities of reduc-
ing or increasing the nominal wage.
A number of observations can be gleaned from Proposition 5. First, setting c = 0
reveals that the frictionless percentiles of real wage growth are simply determined by the
rate of productivity growth, , as one would expect. Second, the existence of wage rigidity
reduces the upper percentiles of wage growth relative to the frictionless case, reecting rms
compression of wage increases. Moreover, as ination, , and productivity growth, , rise,
the frictionless probability that a rm wishes to reduce nominal wages, p 

(; ), declines.
Thus, on average one should observe the upper percentiles of real wage growth rising more
than one-for-one with productivity growth, , and rising with ination, .
Downward wage rigidity also implies that a non-negligible range of the lower percentiles
of wage growth will exactly correspond to zero nominal wage growth, or real wage growth
at minus the rate of ination,  . In this regime in equation (10), the lower percentiles
of wage growth fall one-for-one with the rate of ination by denition. It is through this
e¤ect that increases in ination grease the wheelsof the labor market by allowing rms
to achieve reductions in labor costs without resorting to costly nominal wage cuts.
Finally, equation (10) implies that very low percentiles of the wage growth distribution
that correspond to nominal wage cuts (real wage cuts of greater magnitude than  ) also
will rise with ination and productivity growth. To see this, note that these percentiles
are increasing in the frictionless probability of raising wages, p+

(; ), which in turn is
increasing in  and . This last result can seem odd at rst. However, the logic behind
it mirrors the intuition for the e¤ects of  and  on upper percentiles. When ination and
real wage growth are large, a rm expects that it will likely reverse nominal wage cuts in the
near future. As a result, the rm is less inclined to incur the costs of reducing wages, and
wage cuts are reduced in magnitude for a given lagged wage. Moreover, high ination and
productivity growth relax the upward pressure downward wage rigidity places on the wages
rms inherit from the past. As a result, rms do not need to reduce wages as often or as
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much to achieve any given level of the current wage, further reducing the magnitude of wage
cuts.
3 Empirical Implementation
The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US, and from the New Earnings
Survey (NES) for Great Britain. For all datasets, the relevant wage measure used is the
basic hourly wage rate for respondents aged 16 to 65. The CPS samples are taken from
longitudinally linked Merged Outgoing Rotation Group les from 1979 to 2002. The PSID
data are taken from the random (not poverty) samples for the years 1971 to 1992. The
NES for Great Britain is an individual level panel for each year running from 1975 through
to 1999.
Since the descriptive properties of wage rigidity in these datasets have been well-explored
in previous analyses19 the purpose here is not to provide a full descriptive account of down-
ward wage rigidity. For reference, though, Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for
wage growth and key variables that will be used in the forthcoming analysis.
It should be noted, however, that the NES data for Great Britain have a number of key
advantages for the purposes of this paper, especially in comparison with the CPS and PSID
samples for the US. Most starkly, the NES yields comparatively very large sample sizes: one
obtains sample sizes of 6080,000 wage change observations each year. A second advantage
of the NES data is its sample period, 19752001. This is useful because variation in the rate
of ination will be used in what follows to gauge the impact of wage rigidity on wage growth,
and the UK experienced signicant variation in ination over this period relative to the US
(see Figure 2). A nal key advantage of the NES sample is that measurement error in these
data is less problematic relative to the individually reported data of the CPS and PSID
samples. The reason is that the NES is collected from employerspayroll records, thereby
leaving less scope for error (see Nickell & Quintini, 2003, for more on this). This is important
because previous empirical studies have gone to some lengths to control for the e¤ects of
measurement error (Smith, 2000; Altonji & Devereux, 2000). The relative accuracy of the
NES allows us to concentrate on substantive questions, and is thus an important virtue in
this context.20
19See Card & Hyslop (1997) for the CPS, Kahn (1997) and Altonji & Devereux (2000) for the PSID, and
Nickell & Quintini (2003) for the NES.
20Nickell & Quintini (2003) compared the accuracy of hourly wage changes in the NES with those obtained
from a sample whose payslip was checked in the British Household Panel Study and found remarkably similar
properties in both datasets.
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3.1 The Impact of Low Ination on Wage Growth
This section explores whether the empirical predictions of section 2 are borne out in the data
summarized above. First, visual evidence is presented for the compression of wage increases
is presented using the empirical distribution of wage growth, as anticipated in Figure 1.
In addition, evidence on the e¤ects of ination and real growth on the percentiles of wage
growth based on equation (10) is also assessed.
Visual Evidence from the Distribution of Wage Growth. As noted in section 2.3,
a particularly simple approach is to observe di¤erences in the distribution of wage growth
in periods of high ination compared to periods of low ination. To this end, gures 3(a)
and 4(a) present estimates of the density of log real wage growth for periods with di¤erent
ination rates using the PSID for the US, and the NES for Britain.21 Notice that lower
ination leads to a compression of the lower and, more importantly for the purposes of
this paper, the upper tail of the wage change distribution, precisely in accordance with the
predictions of section 2.
One could argue, however, that at least some of the observed di¤erences are due to
changes in other variables, such as the industrial, age, gender, regional etc. compositions of
the workforce. To address this, a set of micro-level control variables are introduced for each
dataset, which are summarized in Table 2. Changes in these variables are controlled for
using the method of DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996), henceforth DFL. This method is
useful because it requires no parametric assumptions on the e¤ects of these controls on wage
growth. Given the intrinsically non-linear character of the wage policy (4), this is especially
helpful.
The DFL procedure is a simple re-weighting of the observed distribution of wage growth
to estimate the counterfactual distribution that would prevail if the distribution of worker
characteristics did not change.22 Figures 3(b) and 4(b) display density estimates of the DFL
re-weighted distribution of log real wage changes for di¤erent ination periods for the PSID
and NES. Again, one can clearly detect that lower rates of ination are associated with
a compression both of tails of the wage growth distribution, in line with the predictions of
section 2.
21The time-varying accuracy of the wage imputation ags in the CPS makes this a less useful exercise for
the CPS data.
22Denote a base year, T (this will be the nal sample year), worker characteristics, x, and the year of
the relevant x distribution, tx. The time t counterfactual distribution of wage growth can be written as
f ( ln!t; tx = T ) =
R
f ( ln!jx) dF (xjtx = T ) =
R
f ( ln!jx)  dF (xjtx = t), where  = dF (xjtx=T )dF (xjtx=t) =
Pr(tx=T jx)
Pr(tx=tjx) 
Pr(tx=t)
Pr(tx=T )
, and where the second equality follows from BayesRule. The weights  are estimated
using a probit model.
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Evidence from Percentile Regressions. To assess whether the variation in the distrib-
ution of wage growth varies systematically with the impact of downward wage rigidity, the
e¤ects of ination on the percentiles of real wage growth are now estimated based on the
results of Proposition 5. In particular, regressions of the following form are estimated
Pnrt = n + nrt + nt + z
0
rt'n + "nrt ; (11)
where Pnrt is the nth percentile of the DFL re-weighted real wage growth distribution in
region r at time t derived above, and zrt is a vector of controls that could potentially a¤ect
the distribution of wage growth.
To estimate (11), measures of frictionless average real wage growth, rt, and of the
ination rate, t, are needed. For the latter, the CPI-U-X1 series for the US, and the
April to April log change in the Retail Price Index for Great Britain are used. To measure
rt, the result of Proposition 4 is invoked i.e. that wage rigidity has no e¤ect on average
wage growth in the model. Thus, rt is measured using the observed regional average real
wage growth rate.23 In accordance with equation (10), (11) is estimated by Least Squares
weighted by the size of the region at each date.
The control variables, zrt, used are as follows. First, controls for the absolute change
in the rate of ination are included. This is motivated by the hypothesis that greater
ination volatility will yield greater dispersion in relative wages regardless of the existence
of wage rigidity (see Groshen & Schweitzer, 1999). In addition, the current and lagged
regional unemployment rates are included. This is motivated by the idea that the existence
of downward wage rigidity may have unemployment e¤ects. This will lead to workers
leavingthe wage change distribution, and so any resulting distributional consequences are
controlled for.24
Based on the predictions of Proposition 5, the coe¢ cients of interest in (11) for estimating
the e¤ects of wage rigidity are n and n. Recall that the key prediction that is being tested
that downward wage rigidity leads to compression of wage increases implies that upper
percentiles of real wage growth will rise with ination, and will rise more than one-for-one
with average real wage growth. Thus, the model predicts that n > 0 and that n > 1 for
large n.
The results from estimating (11) for each dataset are reported in Table 3. The results
provide strong evidence that the upper tail of the wage growth distribution is compressed as
23A trimmed mean for regional real wage growth is used to exclude the e¤ects of outliers on rt. I trim
log real wage growth below 50 log points and above 50 log points. To see that such observations are rare,
see Figures 3 and 4.
24Additionally, controls for any distortion to the wage growth distributions due to limitations of the
datasets used are included.
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a result of downward wage rigidity, consistent with the predictions of the model. To see this,
rst consider the results for the upper percentiles of real wage growth. For all datasets, the
estimated impact of ination is positive for the 70th90th percentiles, and is often signicant.
Likewise, the coe¢ cients on aggregate wage growth exceed unity for these upper percentiles
of the real wage growth distribution, and are strongly signicant. Recall from section 2.3
that these results are consistent with higher ination and aggregate wage growth easing the
compression of wage increases, as implied by the model of worker resistance to wage cuts.
It is worth noting that these e¤ects are particularly signicant in the NES data for Great
Britain. This is to be expected given the advantages of these data noted above: The British
economy experienced large variation in the rate of ination over the sample period; the data
are taken from employer records minimizing measurement error problems; and the sample
sizes are large. These all aid the ability of the regressions based on equation (11) to detect
the e¤ects of ination and mean wage growth where they exist.
For reference, Table 3 also reports estimates of the e¤ects of ination and average real
wage growth on lower percentiles. Note that the predictions of the model on the n and n
for lower percentiles depend on the position of zero nominal wage growth in the distribution
of real wage growth. For percentiles that predominantly lie in the spike at zero nominal
wage growth over the sample period, equation (10) implies that n < 0, and that the e¤ects
of rt will be attenuated toward zero. For very low percentiles of real wage growth that
predominantly lie below the spike at zero, however, equation (10) implies that n > 0 and
n > 1.
The results in Table 3 for the lower tail of the wage growth distribution also are consistent
with the predictions of the model. The spike at zero nominal wage growth appears between
the 20th30th percentiles in the CPS data, the 10th30th percentiles in the PSID, and
the 20th40th percentiles in the NES. As predicted in section 2.3, higher ination has a
signicantly negative e¤ect and the e¤ects of aggregate wage growth, rt, are attenuated
toward zero at these percentiles. Likewise, for percentiles that lie below the spike at zero
nominal wage growth it can be seen that the e¤ect of higher ination is diminished and the
coe¢ cient on average regional wage growth rises above unity once more.
Together, these results provide strong evidence for the prediction that the upper tail of
the wage growth distribution will be compressed as a result of downward wage rigidity. In
all datasets one can detect greater compression of wage increases as ination and mean wage
growth decline that is statistically signicant. A natural question in the light of this is the
economic signicance of the estimates in Table 3. This is addressed by now estimating the
increase in real wage growth implied by these estimates.
The E¤ect of Downward Wage Rigidity on Aggregate Wage Growth. Proposition
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4 showed that downward wage rigidity should have no e¤ect on aggregate wage growth.
This contrasts with previous literature that has reported positive estimates of the e¤ects
of downward wage rigidity on average real wage growth. A possible reason is that this
literature has neglected the compression of wage increases as a result of worker resistance
to wage cuts. This section derives estimates of the e¤ect of downward wage rigidity on
aggregate wage growth based on the results in Table 3. Specically, the di¤erence between
average real wage growth when ination is low (L) and average real wage growth when
ination is high (H) is estimated,
^ = bE ( ln!jL; x; z)  bE ( ln!jH ; x; z) : (12)
To do this, note that the mean of a random variable may be expressed as a simple average
of its percentiles, so that bE ( ln!jL; x; z) can be estimated as a simple average of the
predicted values of the percentiles of wage growth obtained from estimating equation (11).
These predicted percentiles also allow a discretization of the entire distribution of wage
growth, so that the increase in aggregate wage growth due to downward wage rigidity can be
decomposed into two components. The rst is the increase in wage growth due to restricted
nominal wage cuts in times of low ination. Following the literature, this is referred to as the
wage sweep up(wsu). The second component is the reduction in average wage growth due
to compressed wage increases under low ination, the wage sweep back(wsb).25 The sum
of the wage sweep up and the wage sweep back is therefore equal to . Since the literature
has ignored the wage sweep back e¤ect, the wage sweep up provides an estimate of the
increase in aggregate wage growth comparable to the estimates in the literature. Therefore,
comparison of wsu with  provides a sense of the overestimate of the increase in aggregate
wage growth implied by ignoring compression of wage increases.
This procedure is performed on 99 estimated wage growth percentiles using a value for
H equal to 20% (the midpoint of the sample maxima in the US and Britain; see Figure 2)
and a value for L equal to 1% (the sample minimum for both the US and Britain). The
results are reported in lower panel of Table 3. Consistent with previous literature, estimates
of the wage sweep up due to constrained wage cuts range from 0.75 percentage points to
1.5 percentage points. These values span the estimates from Card & Hyslop (1997) which
25Specically, the wage sweep up and sweep back are equal to,
dwsu = bE ( ln!  1 ( ln! <  ) jL)  bE ( ln!  1 ( ln! <  ) jH) ;dwsb = bE ( ln!  1 ( ln!   ) jL)  bE ( ln!  1 ( ln!   ) jH) ;
where bE ( ln!  1 ( ln! < ) j) is estimated from the predicted percentiles of wage growth and 1 () is
the indicator function.
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suggest that the wage sweep up due to low ination is on the order of 1 percentage point.
However, the wage sweep back due to compressed wage increases is of similar magnitude,
ranging from 0.71 to 1.37 percentage points, and serves to o¤set the e¤ects of constrained
wage cuts, exactly along the lines of the predictions of section 2. Together, these lead to
estimates of the increase in aggregate wage growth under low ination to be in the range of
0.02 to 0.15 percentage points. These values are an order of magnitude smaller than the
estimates a researcher would obtain by neglecting the compression of wage increases in times
of low ination.
Thus, as anticipated by the theoretical predictions of section 2, there is abundant empir-
ical evidence that rms compress wage increases as a response to downward wage rigidity.
Moreover, the evidence is both statistically and economically signicant: Neglecting the
compression of wage increases leads to a substantial overestimate of the increase in wage
growth due to downward wage rigidity.
4 Macroeconomic Implications
The preceding sections have shown, both as a theoretical and an empirical issue, that there
is little reason to believe that downward wage rigidity imposes costs on rms by raising the
rate of growth of real wages. This section turns to the question of how exactly downward
wage rigidity imposes costs on rms, and whether or not these costs are large.
4.1 Approximating the Costs of Wage Rigidity to a Firm
A simple approximation to the reduction in the average value of a match due to wage
rigidity can be derived from the model. Denote the latter as C  E (J   J) where J
is the frictionless (c = 0) value of a match. It is straightforward to show that C can be
approximated by26
C (; )   (; )  E (!
)
1  e , where  (; )  c
E   lnW 1 j;  : (13)
Equation (13) is useful from a number of perspectives. First, it shows that the costs of wage
rigidity to rms are driven by the reductions in productivity that rms must accept when
they reduce wages, rather than by direct increases in the cost of labor. To see this, note from
26Note that, for c  0, one can write C  dCdc jc=0  c. Then note that dCdc jc=0 =  E

@J
@c +
@J
@W
@W
@c
 jc=0 =
 E P1t=0 tat lnW t 1 t  =  E ( lnW 1 ) E(a)1 e where the second equality follows from the envelope
theorem and the third follows from the independence of  lnA and a. Noting that, when c = 0, ! = a
leads to equation (13).
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equation (2) that C is equal to the average decline in worker e¤ort due to wage cuts. The
latter suggests another attractive feature of equation (13): It provides an approximation
to the costs of wage rigidity to rms that is una¤ected by the (simplifying) assumption
that workers productivity depends on the log real wage in (1). Finally, noticing that
E (!) = (1  e) is the discounted value of real frictionless labor costs, equation (13) also
has the simple interpretation that the reduction in the value of a match due to wage rigidity
is approximately equivalent to increasing the level of average real wages by a factor , which
is equal to the marginal productivity cost of a one percent nominal wage cut, c, times the
expected frictionless nominal wage cut, jE ( lnW 1 )j. Thus  can be interpreted as a
compensating wage di¤erential that compensates rms for the costs induced by downward
wage rigidity.
To get a quantitative sense for  (; ), it is necessary to quantify c and jE ( lnW 1 j; )j.
To quantify the latter in the model, note that all one needs is a value for the dispersion of
idiosyncratic shocks, . The wage growth distributions summarized in Figures 3 and 4
imply a value for  approximately equal to 0.1.27
Quantifying the marginal e¤ort cost of a one percent wage cut, c, is less straightforward.
In the model, c is closely related to the size of the spike at zero in the distribution of nominal
wage growth. Obtaining a value for the spike at zero nominal wage growth is complicated
by measurement error in wages, which can bias down the observed spike by making true
wage freezes appear as small changes (Altonji & Devereux, 2000). To address this, Table 4
reports the implied values for the compensating wage di¤erential for an array of values for the
spike at zero nominal wage growth that would prevail under zero ination and productivity
growth in the model. Values for the spike between 0:075 (approximately the maximum
value observed in the NES data; see Table 1) and 0:4 (more than double the largest values
observed in the datasets in Table 1) are considered.
A number of observations can be gleaned from Table 4. First, for any value of the spike,
the compensating di¤erential imposed by downward wage rigidity declines as ination and
productivity growth rise. The intuition for this is simple: Higher ination and productivity
growth imply that desired wage growth is higher, and consequently downward wage rigidity
is less binding, thereby imposing smaller costs on rms. Second, higher values of the spike
are associated with larger compensating di¤erentials. The simple reason is that larger values
of the spike are indicative of larger values of c which in turn raise the costs of wage rigidity.
Importantly, a third implication of Table 4 is that, for rates of ination and productivity
27The standard deviations in high ination periods implied by Figures 3 and 4 are respectively 0:10 in the
PSID data, and 0:11 in the NES data. These values di¤er from the standard deviations reported in Table
2 because the latter include outlier wage changes that are likely to be driven by measurement error.
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growth observed in the data,28 an upper bound on the costs of wage rigidity to rms is
that they are equivalent to an increase in average real labor costs of around 0:68 percentage
points. Interestingly, Table 4 also implies that this compensating di¤erential would be much
larger in the event of trend deation in prices or negative productivity growth. For ination
rates of  5 percent and productivity growth of  2:5 percent, downward wage rigidity could
be equivalent to an increase in aggregate real wages of up to 1:5 percentage points.
4.2 Are the Costs Large or Small?
A natural question is whether these costs are large or small. This question is examined from
two important perspectives. In this subsection, the implied long run employment e¤ects
are addressed. It is possible to embed the model of an ongoing employment relationship
from section 1 into a simple model of the aggregate labor market in the long run. Assume
that there is free entry of rms into the creation of new jobs and that new jobs are ex ante
identical. It follows that the expected prots of a rm upon creating a job must equal
zero in equilibrium. By reducing expected prots relative to a frictionless environment,
downward wage rigidity leads to a reduction in the level of average wages that is consistent
with zero prots. The required reduction in average wages is that which is equivalent to the
reduction in expected prots due to downward wage rigidity. Equation (13) tells us exactly
that: It says that average wages must fall by the compensating di¤erential factor  relative
to a frictionless world in order to maintain zero expected prots in the presence of downward
wage rigidity. Firms achieve this in the model by reducing the average initial wage. The
implied reduction in equilibrium employment due to downward wage rigidity, therefore, is
simply equal to the long run percentage point reduction in the average real wage, , times
the long run elasticity of the e¤ective supply of workers.
In their analysis of the employment e¤ects of long run reductions in wages of low skilled
workers, Juhn, Murphy & Topel (1991) report estimates of the long run supply elasticity
that lie below 0:4 for the US (see pp. 112121). Applying this upper bound to the values of
the compensating di¤erential  in Table 4 suggests that, for observed rates of ination and
productivity growth, the reduction in employment attributable to downward wage rigidity
will lie below 0:4 0:68 = 0:27 percentage points in the US.
There is no comparable estimate of the long run labor supply elasticity for Britain.
However, because the NES data for Britain are drawn from payroll records, and therefore
are relatively free from measurement error, it is arguable that the observed spike reported
in Table 1 is likely to be representative of the true spike. Table 1 reveals that the spike
28Ination in both countries over the period remained above 1% (see Figure 2) and annual growth in
output per hour remained above 1%.
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consistently lies below 7 percent in the NES data. Even if the the long run labor supply
elasticity of the supply of workers were as high as 2, the values of  in Table 4 suggest
a reduction in employment attributable to downward wage rigidity of approximately 2 
0:085 = 0:17 percentage points for observed rates of ination and productivity growth.
Compared to either the cyclical or secular variation in the unemployment rate in the US and
Britain experienced over the period considered in this paper, this number is very small.
The values for the compensating wage di¤erential in Table 4 also highlight that matters
could be di¤erent in a context of trend deation or negative growth. The results of Table
4 suggest that in such an environment, the reduction in employment generated by wage
rigidity could be as much as 0:4 1:5 = 0:6 percentage points.
4.3 Overstatement of Costs in Prior Studies
A second sense in which the magnitude of the costs of downward wage rigidity can be
assessed is in comparison to the implied costs if one neglects compression of wage increases,
as previous literature has done. The preceding empirical results showed that this can lead
one to conclude erroneously that downward wage rigidity raises the annual rate of growth of
real wages by approximately one percentage point per year when ination is low. Similar
estimates are reported in Card & Hyslop (1997). To a rstorder approximation this implies
a rise in average real labor costs equal to29
C^  ^  E (!
)
1  e where ^  0:01
e
1  e : (14)
Equation (14) has an analogous interpretation to (13). It says that a one percentage point
increase in the rate of growth of real wages is equivalent to a permanent increase in the
average level of real wages by a factor of 0:01 e= (1  e). To quantify this, note that
if workers and rms separate with probability  each year, and the real interest rate is r,
then the rms discount factor is equal to  = (1  ) = (1 + r). In the US economy, the
quarterly separation probability is approximately 0.1, implying a value of  = 0:344 on an
annual basis. Setting r = 0:05 yields a value of  = 0:625. Given average productivity
growth of 2 percent, this suggests that ignoring compression of wage increases implies costs
of downward wage rigidity equivalent to a 1:76% increase in average real labor costs. For
observed values of ination and growth, the latter is more than double the upper-bound
29If downward wage rigidity raises the rate of real wage growth by g, this implies an increase in average
discounted labor costs equal to E
hP1
t=0 
tet (1 + g)
t
!t
i
  E P1t=0 tet!t . For small g, the latter is
approximately equal to g e

1 e
E(!)
1 e .
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estimate of the true costs of wage rigidity implied by the model above.
The results of Table 4 also provide an important perspective on the overstatement of the
costs due to downward wage rigidity in prior research. They suggest that the estimated costs
in studies that neglect the compression of wage increases exceed the true costs that would
prevail even in the presence of 5 percent trend deation and  2:5 percent real growth. Thus,
neglecting the compression of wage increases induced by downward wage rigidity provides a
misleading picture of the true costs of wage rigidity imposed on rms.
5 Conclusions
In his presidential address, Tobin (1972) argued that, if workers are reluctant to accept
reductions in their nominal wages, a certain amount of ination may grease the wheels
of the labor market by easing reductions in real labor costs. Exploring the macroeconomic
implications of downward wage rigidity from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
I nd that these e¤ects are likely to be small. An explicit model of worker resistance to
nominal wage cuts reveals that rms will compress wage increases as well as wage cuts in
the presence of downward wage rigidity. This compression of wage increases culminates in
the prediction that worker resistance to wage cuts has no e¤ect on aggregate wage growth
in the model, challenging a common intuition in previous empirical literature on downward
wage rigidity.
To assess the empirical relevance of these predictions, testable implications of the model
are taken to micro-data for the U.S. and Great Britain. These data reveal signicant evidence
for compression of wage increases related to downward wage rigidity. Moreover, accounting
for this limits the estimated increase in aggregate real wage growth due to downward wage
rigidity to be much closer to zero.
Returning to the model, the implied costs of downward wage rigidity to rms can be
approximated using available data. This reveals two senses in which the costs of wage rigidity
are small for the rates of ination and productivity growth observed in the U.S. and Britain
over recent decades. First, erroneously concluding that downward wage rigidity raises the
rate of aggregate wage growth, as previous literature has done, leads to a substantial (more
than twofold) overstatement of the costs of wage rigidity to rms. Second, the implied long
run disemployment e¤ects of wage rigidity under zero ination are shown to be unlikely to
reduce employment by more than 0:25 of a percentage point. These results suggest that
downward wage rigidity does not provide a strong argument against the adoption of a low
ination target.
Stepping back from this, one might ask whether the mechanism put forward in this paper
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that rms compress wage increases in the face of worker resistance to wage cuts really
rings true in the real world. Bewley (2000) reports survey evidence that rms temper wage
increases in response to worker resistance to wage cuts:
[Business leaders] take account of the fact that, if they raise the level of pay
today, it will remain high in the future. I hear a lot about this last point now.
[...] Some say that they are not now increasing pay [...] because they know they
will not be able to reverse the increases during the next downturn. Bewley
(2000), p.46.
In addition, there is evidence of explicitly bargained mediation of wage growth as an alter-
native to wage cuts:
General Motors Corps historic health care deal with the United Auto Work-
ers will require active workers to forgo $1-an-hour in future wage hikes [...] Allen
Wojczynski, a 36-year GM employee, said the companys proposal seems accept-
able [...] He had been expecting the automaker to ask its workers for pay cuts to
trim health care costs. I could live with it, giving up $1 an hour of my future
pay raises,said Wojczynski [...] Detroit News, October 21st 2005.30
Thus, compression of raises is used in practice as an approach to limiting labor costs in the
face of poor economic conditions, and thereby can limit disemployment e¤ects of worker
resistance to wage cuts.
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Real Wage Growth Implied by the Model. The histogram is 
simulated from the model with downward wage rigidity (c > 0). The solid blue line is the 
true density of frictionless wage growth (c=0). The dashed red line is the density implied by 
imposing symmetry in the upper tail of the histogram. 
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Figure 2: US and UK Inflation over the Sample Periods. 
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Figure 3: Density Estimates of Log Real Wage Growth Distributions (PSID). Results using an 
Epanechnikov kernel over 250 data points with a bandwidth of 0.005. Micro controls for re-
weighted density are age, sex, education, 1-digit industry, 1-digit occupation, region, self 
employment, and tenure. 
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Figure 4: Density Estimates of Log Real Wage Growth Distributions (NES). Results using an 
Epanechnikov kernel over 250 data points with a bandwidth of 0.005. Micro controls for re-
weighted density are age, sex, region (including London dummy), 2-digit industry, 2-digit 
occupation, and major union coverage. 
Year (a) CPS (b) PSID (c) NES 
 Obs. spike Δω<0 Obs. spike Δω<0 Obs. spike Δω<0 
1971    1,520 10.39 34.41    
1972    1,527 11.59 32.35    
1973    1,599 8.88 46.34    
1974    1,676 8.35 56.74    
1975    1,733 7.39 42.07    
1976    1,471 7.48 34.33 60,318 0.67 41.00 
1977    1,468 8.65 36.72 64,838 1.43 77.64 
1978    1,605 7.35 37.57 66,168 2.15 33.73 
1979    1,704 6.51 51.35 65,619 2.33 38.39 
1980 25,626 5.70 53.39 1,756 4.38 52.51 66,574 0.44 46.81 
1981 28,343 5.79 48.07 1,746 7.22 50.29 70,431 2.62 40.53 
1982 27,426 10.41 45.76 1,664 8.17 38.58 75,745 3.01 49.34 
1983 26,521 12.73 45.99 1,606 14.51 44.46 77,910 2.06 19.93 
1984 26,675 12.76 46.29 1,621 12.95 46.33 75,652 5.09 41.62 
1985 13,122 12.28 43.72 1,702 11.16 41.07 75,311 1.69 50.80 
1986 6,935 13.67 40.63 1,830 15.30 42.51 74,487 1.39 18.88 
1987 27,348 13.68 45.94 1,801 15.16 49.53 74,848 2.52 24.97 
1988 26,825 12.59 46.43 1,848 15.42 50.87 73,440 1.55 20.57 
1989 26,736 11.99 47.90 1,863 13.96 53.30 72,278 2.13 44.91 
1990 28,045 11.14 49.11 1,815 12.01 54.66 70,752 2.49 50.33 
1991 28,688 11.61 46.52 2,441 13.93 49.77 72,065 2.75 26.40 
1992 28,521 13.43 44.94 2,441 16.39 45.60 76,335 4.87 30.87 
1993 28,468 13.25 45.73    78,171 6.95 27.91 
1994 26,584 11.88 44.49    78,167 6.36 48.14 
1995 10,227 12.20 45.32    79,644 5.55 51.37 
1996 8,458 11.46 44.68    82,489 1.53 32.31 
1997 25,386 10.67 41.53    80,221 1.71 33.52 
1998 25,255 10.31 38.00    76,999 4.08 51.19 
1999 25,489 9.80 41.02    77,227 4.38 25.93 
2000 25,215 9.68 44.19       
2001 24,574 9.32 42.65       
2002 26,575 10.32 42.38       
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of Wage Growth for the CPS, PSID, and NES.  “Obs.” refers to 
the number of wage change observations per year.  The spike is the fraction of wage changes 
equal to zero.  “Δω<0” reports the fraction of real wage cuts each year.
(a) CPS: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change in log real wage 547042 0.025061 0.310781 -5.72642 4.562072 
Age 547042 38.01381 12.52692 16 65 
Female 547042 0.501651 0.499998 0 1 
Education:      
< High School 546516 0.175773 0.380628 0 1 
High School 546516 0.451021 0.497596 0 1 
Some College 546516 0.287882 0.452776 0 1 
College Degree 546516 0.071936 0.258382 0 1 
Advanced Degree 546516 0.013388 0.114931 0 1 
Metropolitan area 521083 0.710509 0.453527 0 1 
Non-white 547042 0.204385 0.403252 0 1 
Self-employed 546877 0.000104 0.010209 0 1 
      
(b) PSID:      
Change in log real wage 33283 0.022087 0.337482 -3.72463 4.619859 
Age 33283 38.24457 11.53739 18 65 
Female 33283 0.196617 0.397446 0 1 
Education:      
0-5 grades 30671 0.036256 0.186929 0 1 
6-8 grades 30671 0.114375 0.318272 0 1 
9-11 grades 30671 0.218382 0.413155 0 1 
12 grades 30671 0.448469 0.497346 0 1 
Some College 30671 0.130253 0.336587 0 1 
College degree 30671 0.040201 0.196433 0 1 
Advanced degree 30671 0.012064 0.109171 0 1 
Tenure:      
[1, 1.5] years 30536 0.092907 0.290306 0 1 
(1.5, 3.5) years 30536 0.204546 0.403376 0 1 
[3.5, 9.5) years 30536 0.354008 0.47822 0 1 
[9.5, 19.5) years  30536 0.236999 0.425249 0 1 
19.5 years + 30536 0.111541 0.314805 0 1 
Self-employed 33257 0.014313 0.118779 0 1 
      
(c) NES:      
Change in log real wage 1922184 0.026539 0.190503 -9.9292 9.757886 
Age 1922184 41.01464 11.85092 16 65 
Female 1922184 0.409069 0.491662 0 1 
Major union coverage 1922029 0.426511 0.49457 0 1 
London dummy 1919091 0.144433 0.351528 0 1 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics.  The CPS sample also contains 2-digit industry classifications, and 
50 regional dummies; the PSID sample also contains 1-digit industry and 1-digit occupation and 
6 region dummies; the NES sample also contains 2-digit industry and 2-digit occupation and 10 
region dummies.   
 CPS (US, 1980-2002) PSID (US, 1971-1992) NES (UK, 1976-1999) 
Percentile Coefft. on πt Coefft. on μt Coefft. on πt Coefft. on μt Coefft. on πt Coefft. on μt 
P10 0.124 [0.080] 1.494 [0.160] ** -0.312 [0.094] ** 0.695 [0.140] ** -0.117 [0.050] * 1.086 [0.120] ** 
P20 -0.381 [0.054]** 0.821 [0.110] ** -0.551 [0.110] ** 0.404 [0.110] ** -0.212 [0.020] ** 0.835 [0.071] ** 
P30 -0.312 [0.087]** 0.295 [0.058] ** 0.003 [0.048] 0.902 [0.060] ** -0.142 [0.019] ** 0.841 [0.051] ** 
P40 -0.017 [0.021] 0.662 [0.032] ** 0.013 [0.037] 0.927 [0.042] ** -0.0905 [0.015] ** 0.883 [0.036] ** 
P60 -0.018 [0.022] 0.792 [0.050] ** 0.022 [0.037] 0.999 [0.046] ** 0.0669 [0.013] ** 1.065 [0.034] ** 
P70 0.061 [0.029]* 1.015 [0.068] ** 0.090 [0.053] 1.113 [0.048] ** 0.151 [0.016] ** 1.190 [0.043] ** 
P80 0.101 [0.039]* 1.277 [0.072] ** 0.205 [0.083] * 1.224 [0.082] ** 0.184 [0.018] ** 1.205 [0.054] ** 
P90 0.205 [0.061]** 1.704 [0.094] ** 0.301 [0.092] ** 1.507 [0.110] ** 0.153 [0.033] ** 1.057 [0.082] ** 
wsu +0.753% +1.517% +1.085% 
wsb -0.713% -1.366% -1.063% 
λ +0.040% +0.150% +0.021% 
* significant at the 5% level; ** 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3:  The Effect of Inflation and Mean Real Wage Growth on Percentiles of Real Wage Growth.  Least squares regressions 
weighted by region size. Controls include the variables in Table 2, region, absolute change in inflation, as well as, CPS: 2-digit 
industry, current and lagged state unemployment rate, and dummies for the years 1989-93 and 1994-95 to control for the effects of 
imputed wage data; PSID: 1-digit industry and occupation; NES: 2-digit industry and occupation, current and lagged regional 
unemployment rate, and a dummy for the year 1977 to control for the incomes policy of that year. Standard errors in brackets robust to 
non-independence within years.  The statistics wsu, wsb, and λ are described in the main text.
 Spike = 0.075 (c = 0.02) 
μ \ π -0.05 -0.025 0 0.025 0.05 0.1 
-0.025 0.184% 0.147% 0.113% 0.085% 0.061% 0.029% 
0 0.147% 0.113% 0.085% 0.061% 0.043% 0.018% 
0.025 0.113% 0.085% 0.061% 0.043% 0.029% 0.011% 
0.05 0.085% 0.061% 0.043% 0.029% 0.018% 0.007% 
       
 Spike = 0.15 (c = 0.045) 
μ \ π -0.05 -0.025 0 0.025 0.05 0.1 
-0.025 0.414% 0.330% 0.255% 0.191% 0.138% 0.064% 
0 0.330% 0.255% 0.191% 0.138% 0.096% 0.041% 
0.025 0.255% 0.191% 0.138% 0.096% 0.064% 0.025% 
0.05 0.191% 0.138% 0.096% 0.064% 0.041% 0.015% 
       
 Spike = 0.4 (c = 0.16) 
μ \ π -0.05 -0.025 0 0.025 0.05 0.1 
-0.025 1.472% 1.172% 0.907% 0.679% 0.491% 0.229% 
0 1.172% 0.907% 0.679% 0.491% 0.342% 0.146% 
0.025 0.907% 0.679% 0.491% 0.342% 0.229% 0.090% 
0.05 0.679% 0.491% 0.342% 0.229% 0.146% 0.053% 
 
Table 4: Compensating Wage Differential γ(μ, π) for Different Values of Inflation (π), Real 
Productivity Growth (μ), and the Spike at Zero Nominal Wage Growth for μ = 0, π = 0. 
